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INTRODUCTION 
In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen—the subject of this conference—took 
up the now-perennial debate concerning whether law is a business or 
a profession, coming down on the side that, although legal practice 
had become too commercialized of late, law was and should be a 
profession.1  In 2010, Tom Morgan—one of the participants in this 
conference—addressed the same question in his book The Vanishing 
American Lawyer and provocatively concluded, contrary to Cohen, 
that “Law in America is not a profession—and that’s a good thing.”2 
 
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  © 
2012 Nancy J. Moore.  All rights reserved.  
 1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 318–19 (1916).  
For an excellent discussion of this book, see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius 
Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the 
Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
1 (2005). 
 2. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 (2010) 
[hereinafter MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER].  He has addressed 
these questions in other publications as well. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Calling 
Law a ‘Profession’ Only Confuses Thinking About the Challenges Lawyers Face, 9 
UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Morgan, Calling Law a 
Profession], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007296; Thomas D. Morgan, 
Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947 (2002) 
[hereinafter Morgan, Abandoning Organized Professionalism].  In my discussion of 
Morgan’s views throughout this Article, I will draw from these two articles, as well as 
from the book itself. 
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For Cohen, the commercialization of law practice—including not 
only advertising, but also the growing number of lawyers serving the 
interests of business clients—was antithetical to the ideals of 
professionalism, in which rather than  “being drawn into modern 
business,” lawyers should be “standing outside it.”3  For Morgan, 
however, lawyers are and should be recognized as primarily economic 
actors.4  Indeed, he encourages them to work toward breaking down 
the barriers that continue to exist between lawyers and other business 
persons who can offer comparable (perhaps even better) services at 
lower prices.5 
What, if any, are the implications of globalization—including the 
increased globalization of law practice6—for the perennial debate 
concerning the professional status of lawyers in the United States and 
elsewhere?  Of course, Cohen did not live to witness the globalization 
phenomenon and therefore was unable to comment on its 
implications for his ideal of law as a profession.  Morgan, on the other 
hand, is an astute observer of globalization and its impact on law 
practice, including radical changes in lawyer regulation recently 
enacted in the U.K. and Australia7—changes that have many U.S. 
lawyers “up in arms.”8  For Morgan, globalization represents the 
culmination of a lengthy process of eliminating restrictive barriers 
that were established at the behest of lawyer organizations such as the 
American Bar Association (ABA), in an effort to establish and 
reinforce lawyers’ monopoly over a wide range of commercial 
activity.9 
According to Morgan, this process of breaking down barriers 
between lawyers and nonlawyers—and between elite and non-elite 
lawyers—began in the United States in the 1960s with a series of 
Supreme Court decisions striking down various anticompetitive rules 
adopted by state courts at the request of lawyer organizations, such as 
 
 3. COHEN, supra note 1, at 31 (quoting Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 address to the 
American Bar Association). 
 4. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 25. 
 5. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 97 
(disapproving as “self-defeating” lawyers’ efforts to challenge the use of online 
services helping people attempting to draft their own legal documents). 
 6. See, e.g., Colloquium, Globalization and the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2305 (2012). 
 7. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 90.  
 8. Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Split Over Nonlawyer Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
2, 2012, at B1(quoting one U.S. lawyer as saying, “I can’t think of anything more 
pernicious or ill-considered”). 
 9. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 71–83. 
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minimum legal fees, advertising bans, and restrictions on the efforts 
of nonlawyer organizations to secure affordable legal services for 
their members.10  More recently, changes in the economy itself—
including the lifting of trade barriers and revolutions in transportation 
and information technology—have led to an unprecedented growth in 
international commerce, accompanied by a “degree of competitive 
pressure unknown when markets were more narrow and 
balkanized.”11  As a result of these changes, U.S. lawyers seeking to 
participate in the new global economy must be prepared to provide 
the services that their clients need, in all parts of the world, at prices 
that are competitive with those offered by other legal service 
providers—lawyers and nonlawyers alike—who are themselves 
located throughout the world, including China, India, Russia, Brazil, 
and Dubai.12 
Morgan recognizes that U.S. lawyers are affected by international 
developments in lawyer regulation, including international trade 
agreements like the General Agreement on Trade and Services 
(GATS), which aims to break down barriers to the smooth flow of 
goods and services (including legal services) between the world’s 
nations.13  Among the other important developments Morgan cites 
are the recent reforms in lawyer regulation in the U.K. and 
Australia,14 which permit not only nonlawyer participation in the 
management and ownership of law firms, but also the creation of 
entirely new business structures in which lawyers will collaborate with 
nonlawyers to provide a wide range of legal and nonlegal services.15 
 
 10. See id. at 73–77.  Here, Morgan discusses such seminal cases as Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down minimum legal fees), Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down prohibition of lawyer 
advertising of fixed fees for routine legal services), and Brotherhood of Trainmen v. 
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (striking down ethical standards 
that prevented a union from establishing a list of lawyers whom the union had found 
to be competent in handling job-related deaths or injuries).  
 11. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 87. 
 12. Id. at 85. 
 13. Id. at 89. 
 14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 15. For a description of these changes, see generally Judith Maute, Global 
Continental Shifts to a New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and 
Consumer Protection: Riding the Wave, reprinted in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE PROFESSION 11 (Francesca 
Bartlett et al. eds., 2011). See also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of 
Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law 
Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW 13, 15 (2009); Steve Mark et al., Preserving the Ethics 
and Integrity of the Legal Profession in an Evolving Market: A Comparative 
Regulatory Response (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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At first glance, these international developments appear to 
constitute unequivocal support for Morgan’s view that, if law ever 
was a profession in the United States and elsewhere, globalization 
inevitably will hasten its demise, forcing lawyers into head-to-head 
competition with nonlawyers and encouraging them to combine with 
nonlawyers to form business structures just like those encountered 
elsewhere in the commercial world.  But closer inspection may yield a 
different interpretation of these events.  In my view, what 
globalization suggests is that U.S. lawyers should adopt a more 
nuanced view of the perennial debate, shedding light not only on 
what it means for an occupation to constitute a profession, but also on 
the question whether professions and professionalization might 
ultimately provide a net benefit to society and are therefore worth 
preserving, although in a somewhat different form than they have 
previously taken. 
In Part I of this Article, I address the implications of globalization 
for answering the question of whether law is indeed a profession.  In 
Part II, I address the implications of globalization for the entirely 
separate question of whether law should be a profession—that is, 
whether lawyer organizations and individual lawyers ought to 
continue to work toward realizing a vision of professionalism that can 
benefit the public in the United States and elsewhere.  I then 
conclude by discussing the continuing relevance of Julius Henry 
Cohen’s views for the ongoing debate over the future of law as a 
profession. 
I.  IS LAW A PROFESSION? 
For all their differences, Cohen and Morgan appear to share a 
vision of what it means to claim that law is a profession rather than a 
business.  Both focus almost exclusively on the assumption that an 
occupation is a profession only if its members actually serve the 
public interest by placing the needs of the community above their 
own selfish interests.16  Cohen then presents some evidence that 
lawyers in fact have acted in the public interest—for example, by 
 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/UK_paper.doc/%24file
/UK_paper.doc. 
 16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 31–32 (citing Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 address to 
the American Bar Association, in which Wilson appealed to individual lawyers not to 
be “sucked into the channels of business” but rather to become “statesmen,” that is, 
“lawyers who can think in the terms of society itself”); MORGAN, THE VANISHING 
AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 50–51 (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER 
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).  
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volunteering their services  to “purg[e] the profession of those who 
fall below the standards of the profession itself.”17 
Morgan, however, argues that law is not a profession, citing a lack 
of evidence that lawyers are or ever were “a separate and superior 
class.”18  Indeed, Morgan also argues that lawyers themselves made 
no such claim until the ABA and others orchestrated a 
professionalism project, that is, a campaign designed to “achieve 
political influence and economic advancement,”19 including a 
monopoly over the right to render legal services and control over the 
admission and regulation of lawyers.  In his view, although some 
individual lawyers have the personal characteristics typically 
associated with the professions (dedication to the public good and 
willingness to sacrifice one’s individual well-being for higher goals), 
the organized bar has abused whatever privileges it has obtained, 
citing “lawyers’ tendency to use that supposed authority to pursue 
their own political agendas and self-interest over the interests of 
justice and the public.”20 
For sociologists like Eliot Freidson, however, what primarily 
distinguishes a profession from other occupations is the fact that the 
members of a profession “control their own work.”21  In connection 
with his service as a member of the ABA Commission on 
Professionalism, Freidson defined the legal profession as “[a]n 
occupation whose members have special privileges, such as exclusive 
 
 17. COHEN, supra note 1, at 22.  Cohen then poses the following rhetorical 
question to business men: “How many of your craft give ten per cent per annum of 
their time to eliminating from their industry or trade the black sheep that are freely 
roaming about?” Id.  
 18. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 40. 
 19. Id. at 55. 
 20. Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 7; see also Morgan, 
Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra note 2, at 950 (to warrant privilege of 
self-regulation, the occupation must present evidence that the “‘occupation as a 
corporate body is able to control itself without abusing its privilege’ because of the 
‘good character’ as well as the competence of its members” (quoting Eliot Freidson, 
Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 220 (Robert L. Nelson et 
al. eds., 1992))).  For Morgan’s view that the praiseworthy traits identified under the 
rubric of professionalism ought to be viewed as the “personal traits” of individual 
professionals, not of groups, see, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING LAWYER, supra 
note 2, at 21. 
 21. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ 
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 215 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
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licensing, that are justified by [certain] assumptions.”22  These 
assumptions concern: 1) the existence of specialized knowledge; 2) 
the inability of clients to evaluate the quality of service, resulting in 
the need for clients to trust the practitioner; 3) the willingness of 
practitioners to subordinate their own self-interest to the public good 
(thereby justifying the client’s trust in the practitioner); and 4) the 
self-regulating nature of the occupation, which is accomplished when 
the occupation organizes itself “in such a way as to assure the public 
. . . that its members are competent, do not violate their client’s trust, 
and transcend their own self-interest.”23  Of course, these assumptions 
may turn out to be ill-founded, in which case we would expect the 
occupation to lose its “special privileges.”24  Nevertheless, so long as 
the public permits the occupation to be self-regulating, the occupation 
would appear, as a matter of descriptive reality, to constitute a 
“profession.”25  Morgan apparently concedes this point;26 
nevertheless, he continues to insist that lawyers’ conduct—
particularly, the conduct of lawyer organizations—has never justified 
 
 22. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” 
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 12 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 773, 784 (1987). 
 25. Cf. John M. Conley, Is Law Really a Profession? Review of The Vanishing 
American Lawyer, by Thomas D. Morgan, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1183, 1187 
(2011) (arguing that law is a profession “in one—perhaps the most—important 
sense” because lawyers “have a monopoly over the provision of many kinds of 
services” and “[s]tate governments have also delegated to us the privilege of self-
regulation”). 
 26. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 66 (“No 
one can deny, for example, that the right to practice law is extensively regulated.  
One must take special training, undergo special testing and be specially licensed to 
practice law, and the license may be taken away if the lawyer fails to adhere to a 
jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct.  The rules to which lawyers are held, in 
turn, have been proposed by bar associations composed of lawyers and imposed by 
judges who are themselves lawyers.  The sociologist’s definition of a profession would 
seem to be confirmed.” (footnotes omitted)).  Elsewhere, however, Morgan rejects 
the “contract” version of professionalism, insisting that there never was a “social 
contract” and that for the “hypothetical contract” to have credibility “there must be a 
sense that people at the time of the alleged contract would have seen it as desirable.” 
Id. at 25.  I argue, to the contrary, that the fact that public representatives have 
permitted the organized bar to play a significant role in the regulation of lawyers is 
evidence supporting the “hypothetical contract” model for professional self-
regulation.  I have endorsed this model elsewhere. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24.  
For more recent support of the hypothetical contract model, see Neil Hamilton, The 
Profession and Professionalism Are Dead? A Review of Thomas Morgan, The 
Vanishing American Lawyer, 20 PROF. LAW. 14 (2010). 
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their historical ability to play a significant role in their own regulation.  
In that sense, he argues, law has never been a true profession. 
With respect to the “self-regulating” character of the legal 
profession, Morgan believes that lawyer organizations vastly 
overstate their authority to make their own rules.  For example, in a 
recent article, Morgan described the ABA’s recent effort to defeat a 
“collaborative law” initiative proposed by the National Commission 
on Uniform State Laws.27  As part of that effort, the ABA argued that 
“acknowledging the power of states to adopt new legal processes and 
lawyer regulation [through legislation] was contrary to the 
professional ideal that lawyers regulate themselves.”28  Morgan rejects 
this claim as “preposterous,”29 and he is right to do so.  Consider, for 
example, the extent to which some U.S. state legislatures actively 
regulate various aspects of lawyer conduct,30 as well as the recent 
proliferation of lawyer regulations that the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government have promulgated.31  But Morgan 
may not be correct in his conclusion that such partial incursions on 
the autonomy of lawyers necessarily prove that law is no longer a 
profession (if it ever was). 32 
 
 27. Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
 28. Id. at 12 (adding that “[n]ever before, the opponents argued, had the ABA 
recognized a legislative power of lawyer regulation, and even though the NCUSL 
proposal took the form of proposed court rules as well, the ABA could not take the 
risk that a legislature might act instead”). 
 29. Id. at 13. 
 30. In California, for example, the state legislature is a co-regulator of the legal 
profession, along with the California Supreme Court. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
div. 3, arts. 5, 6 (West 2003) (Attorneys); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100 
(2013).  In some other jurisdictions, courts are the primary regulators, but they 
permit a wide range of legislative regulation that does not directly conflict with the 
state court’s authority to regulate. See, e.g., Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196 (Colo. 2006) 
(upholding use of state consumer protection law to sue lawyers for false advertising); 
Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994) (upholding legislation limiting 
attorney’s fees in medical malpractice cases). 
 31. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 959 
(2009); Schneyer, supra note 15. 
 32. Morgan is also aware, as others have frequently noted, that lawyers and 
lawyer organizations have never been truly self-regulating in the United States 
because it is courts (and not lawyer organizations) that adopt and enforce rules of 
professional conduct. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 
2, at 66 & n.168.  Nevertheless, he observes, as others have, that “[t]he rules to which 
lawyers are held . . . have been proposed by bar associations composed of lawyers 
and imposed by judges who are themselves lawyers.” Id. at 66; see also Schneyer, 
supra note 15, at 14 (describing the “self-regulatory” nature of U.S. regulatory 
traditions as “still the most comprehensive feature of our regulatory framework”). 
MOORE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:47 PM 
224 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
What do globalization and the recent developments in lawyer 
regulation in the U.K. and Australia contribute to the question of 
whether law is or can remain a self-regulatory profession in any 
meaningful sense of the term?  Consider the fact that, even prior to 
recent reforms, the authority to regulate lawyers in both the U.K. and 
Australia was located in the legislative branch of government, not the 
courts, as it is in most U.S. states.33  Nevertheless, the legislatures in 
those countries had historically delegated the regulation of lawyers 
directly to the relevant professional bodies.34  In this respect, lawyers 
in both the U.K. and Australia were more self-regulating than U.S. 
lawyers, who are regulated primarily by the judicial branch of state 
government, with courts providing a not insignificant check on the 
ability of bar associations to write their own rules and discipline their 
own members.35  As a result of the recent reforms, however, these 
same legislatures intervened to override particular professional rules, 
that is, rules that restricted the ability of lawyers to collaborate with 
nonlawyers in the provision of legal or multidisciplinary services.36  In 
addition, the legislatures created independent, external agencies that 
will now play a significant role in the regulation of lawyers, including 
oversight of the lawyer disciplinary process and primary responsibility 
for consumer complaints seeking redress from legal professionals.37  
Moreover, in the U.K., that agency, the Legal Services Board, will 
have a chairperson and a majority of its members who are 
 
 33. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 15, at 14 (“Like the state supreme courts in the 
U.S., the legislatures in [the U.K. and Australia] traditionally delegated a substantial 
regulatory role to the organized bar.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 14 (describing 1993 report on the 
disciplinary process as administered by the professional bodies in New South Wales, 
Australia); id. at 19 (describing a thirty-year effort by U.K. government to pressure 
legal professional bodies to improve the quality of self-regulation, including a 1990 
act creating a legal Services Ombudsman to oversee complaint handling by the same 
bodies). 
 35. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, “In the Interests of Justice”: Balancing Client 
Loyalty and the Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1775, 1788–89 (2002) (arguing that “many state courts have done quite well in 
carrying out their responsibility to promulgate state ethics codes with provisions that 
reflect not merely the bar’s desires and wishes, but also the public interest”); Fred 
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 36. See SRA CODE OF CONDUCT R. 8 (2007) (U.K.) (prohibition against fee-
sharing with nonlawyers); id. R. 12 (prohibition against practicing in partnership with 
nonlawyer); id. R. 14 (prohibition against practicing in corporate body with 
nonlawyer director, member or shareholder). 
 37. Maute, supra note 15, at 14–16 (Australia); id. at 19 (U.K.).  
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laypersons—that is, individuals who are not authorized to engage in 
activities reserved to legal professionals.38 
Nevertheless, despite these radical incursions on lawyer self-
regulation, the relevant lawyer organizations in the U.K. and 
Australia have not become mere trade associations, as 
“deprofessionalization”39 would appear to dictate; rather, they have 
become “co-regulators,”40 along with the legislatively established 
external agencies.  In the U.K., the Law Society created the Solicitors 
Regulatory Authority (SRA) as a regulatory entity independent from 
the Law Society, which remains as the representative association of 
solicitors.41  The SRA will have primary authority as a “frontline” 
regulator42 for “‘regulatory arrangements’ concerning rules of 
conduct, discipline, education, licensure, indemnification and 
compensation for redress or misconduct,”43 although the legislation 
itself dictates the regulatory objectives that the SRA must promote 
and establishes an independent Office of Legal Complaints (OLC) to 
investigate and resolve all complaints seeking redress from solicitors 
and other legal service providers.44  In Australia, state legislation in 
New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria also established “co-
regulatory systems in which an independent Legal Services 
Commissioner (LSC [or OLSC]) oversees enforcement activities, 
which may be delegated to the relevant professional bodies.”45 
What about the new business structures in which lawyers will share 
ownership and management with nonlawyers?  In the U.K., the 
recent legislation established both Legal Disciplinary Practices 
(LDP), in which approved nonlawyers may participate so long as they 
do not own or control more than twenty-five percent of the practice, 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the 
Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713, 
715 & n.3 (1999) (distinguishing between the use of the term “postprofessionalism” 
to mean deprofessionalization and to mean changes resulting in “a wholesale 
reshaping of this ‘turn-of-the-millennium institution’”). 
 40. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27 (describing U.K. and New South Wales 
reforms as providing for “co-regulation”); Maute, supra note 15, at 13 (noting that 
both the U.K. and Australia have adopted a “co-regulatory model”). 
 41. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 26 & n.48 (describing the perceived conflict 
between the Law Society’s representative and regulatory authority, resulting in the 
requirement of the Legal Services Act of 2007 that each professional body to 
delegate its regulatory authority to an independent organization). 
 42. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27. 
 43. Maute, supra note 15, at 26.  
 44. Id. at 25–26. 
 45. Id. at 14. 
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and Alternative Business Structures (ABS), including 
multidisciplinary practices and external ownership of legal businesses 
(both private and public), in which the participation of approved 
nonlawyers is not limited to any fixed percentage.46  Any firm that 
intends to employ a nonlawyer as a manager of an LDP or as an 
owner or manager of an ABS must apply to the SRA for approval of 
that individual as “fit and proper to assume that role.”47  Lawyers in 
both LDPs and ABSs remain subject to the regulatory authority of 
the SRA, including discipline for violating the SRA-promulgated 
rules of professional practice.48  Indeed, in LDPs, all employees are 
regulated by the SRA; thus even nonlawyers are subject to all the 
rules and regulations that are applicable to lawyers.49  An ABS must 
have at least one manager who is authorized to provide the legal 
services offered by the ABS and must appoint a Head of Legal 
Practice (HOLP), who is a lawyer responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the ABS’s license and for reporting to the licensing 
authority any failure to comply with the terms of the license.50 
In New South Wales, recent legislation approved multidisciplinary 
practices (MDPs) and incorporated legal practices (ILPs), including 
publicly listed practices.51  Solicitor members of both MDPs and ILPs 
continue to be governed by the same rules as other solicitors; 
moreover, upon incorporation, a legal practice must appoint at least 
one legal practitioner director, who is generally responsible for the 
management of any legal services provided.52  In addition to fulfilling 
his or her own professional obligations, the legal practitioner director 
must “implement and maintain ‘appropriate management systems’ to 
enable the provision of legal services in accordance with the 
professional obligations of solicitors and the other obligations 
imposed under [the 2004 legislation],”53 including the responsibility to 
 
 46. Mark et al., supra note 15, at 27–30. 
 47. Id. at 33. 
 48. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27 (describing the Law Society, acting 
through the SRA, as one of several frontline regulators for each class of licensed 
lawyers, with “responsibility for the day-to-day processing of complaints that allege 
serious professional misconduct and for prosecuting disciplinary cases before a 
specialized tribunal”). 
 49. Mark et al., supra note 15, at 29. 
 50. Id. at 32. 
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. Id. at 5–6. 
 53. Id. at 22.  With respect to publicly listed legal practices, the OLSC has 
encouraged firms  
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report to the Law Society of New South Wales any misconduct of a 
solicitor employed by the practice.  The purpose of such requirements 
is “to ensure that the ethical and professional duties of solicitor 
members of MDPs and corporations cannot be disturbed by the 
requirements of other members.”54 
As described above, the recent legislation in the U.K. and 
Australia clearly contemplates that lawyer organizations will continue 
to play a significant role in regulating their own conduct.  Indeed, 
implementation of the legislation in both situations suggests an even 
stronger role not only for individual lawyers (through their lawyer 
organizations), but also for law firms.  Both the SRA in the U.K. and 
the OLSC in New South Wales have announced the intended 
implementation of “proactive, firm-based regulation”55 in which firms 
are required to adopt an “ethical infrastructure,” that is, “formal and 
informal management policies, procedures and controls, work-team 
cultures, and habits of interaction . . . that support and encourage 
ethical behavior.”56  As Ted Schneyer has observed, the type of firm-
based regulation now being developed outside the United States, 
particularly in New South Wales, contemplates the regulator as more 
of a “consultant than an enforcer.”57  Indeed, Schneyer concludes that 
“the emphasis on firm self-assessment and the concept of ‘working 
toward compliance’ suggests that the program is truly collaborative,”58 
thereby reflecting a continuing desire on the part of the public 
representatives in those countries that lawyers remain significantly 
independent and self-regulatory, in the manner of true professionals. 
 
to preserve the ethics of legal practice by explicitly stating in the prospectus, 
constituent documents and shareholder agreements that 
- the primary duty of the legal practice is to the court 
- the secondary duty is to the client; 
- the third duty is to the shareholder; and 
- that where there is a clash between legal profession regulation and the 
Corporations Act, the legal profession regulation will prevail.  
Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted). 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Schneyer, supra note 15, at 30. 
 56. Schneyer, supra note 15, at 30–31 & n.63 (quoting STEVE MARK, THE FUTURE 
IS HERE: GLOBALIZATION AND THE REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, VIEWS 
FROM AN AUSTRALIAN REGULATOR (2009)).  Unlike the legislation in New South 
Wales, the U.K. legislation itself mandated that approved regulators such as the SRA 
develop a system of firm-based regulation. Id. at 33 n.77. 
 57. Id. at 34. 
 58. Id.  
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II.  SHOULD LAW BE A PROFESSION? 
When professionalism is defined in accordance with what Morgan 
describes as the sometimes “preposterous”59 claims of 
“professionalism rhetoric”60—that is, claims that characterize lawyers 
as a “separate and superior class”61—it is difficult to disagree with 
Morgan that “professionalism in the sense developed by the ABA 
during the twentieth century is—and should be seen as—dead.”62  
Although Morgan often focuses on this particular aspect of 
professionalism, he does not limit his disparagement of the concept to 
such excesses of rhetorical zeal.  Rather, he challenges the wisdom of 
continuing to recognize lawyers as a separate occupational group and 
permitting them—through “strong central organizations”—to play a 
significant role in regulating the practice of law.63  He also objects to 
“restrictive rules of practice,” which he views as integral to the 
professionalism project.64 
As we have seen, legislatures in both the U.K. and Australia have 
continued to delegate significant self-regulatory functions to lawyer 
organizations; moreover, they continue to reserve certain (but not all) 
lawyer functions to particular segments of the legal profession.65  They 
may have done so out of political necessity,66 but it is just as likely that 
they did so because they believed that the public benefits when 
lawyers continue to be recognized and treated like  independent and 
self-regulatory professionals.  Cohen clearly believed that law should 
be a profession,67 whereas Morgan is adamant that the concept of law 
as a profession and lawyers as professionals is good neither for 
 
 59. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 60. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 20; see also 
Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 5. 
 61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 62. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
 63. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra note 2, at 
976. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 26 (describing how recent legislation in the 
UK “identifies types of reserved legal activities”); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) 
s 14 (Austl.) (outlining New South Wales’s general prohibition on unauthorized legal 
practice, with exceptions). 
 66. See Maute, supra note 15, at 19–28 (providing a detailed history of events 
leading up to the adoption of the Legal Services Act of 2007, including changes to the 
proposed legislation that were made after members of the Law Society, judges, and 
European bar associations objected to earlier proposals that would have limited 
lawyer organizations to a lesser role than was finally adopted). 
 67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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lawyers (at this time in history)68 nor for the public at large.69  
Whether it is good for lawyers is perhaps beside the point.  The more 
important question is whether the public would be better off 
jettisoning any meaningful concept of professionalism and thereby 
regulating lawyers in the same manner as other, non-professional 
occupations. 
Morgan’s brief against the public benefits of lawyer self-regulation 
is twofold.  First, he argues that, historically, lawyers have not, in fact, 
organized and regulated themselves in a manner that promotes the 
public interest; as a result, there is no reason to assume they will do so 
in the future.70  Second, he argues that, given the changes that have 
produced globalization (including the internationalization of 
commerce and the revolution in information technology), the 
assumptions underlying the hypothetical contract that Freidson and 
others have described are simply irrelevant “to the reality facing 
lawyers today;”71 therefore, the public has no good reason to continue 
allowing lawyers to play a significant role in regulating their own 
conduct. 
I agree that any claim that the history of lawyers represents “a long 
tradition of professional training, self-regulation, and dedication to 
public service” is patently false.72  I also agree that the early 
campaigners for educational requirements, proficiency examinations, 
licensing, and prohibitions against unauthorized practice were 
motivated at least in part by a desire for both higher social standing 
and state protection from market competition.73  I disagree, however, 
that the motivations of these early professionalism campaigners—
either individually or in organizations like the ABA—were merely 
protectionist or that professionalism did not, at least sometimes, 
 
 68. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 128 
(“Lawyers who do not take the new, inescapable realities seriously are going to find 
themselves irrelevant to their clients, and thus irrelevant to those who matter to them 
most.”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 129 (“[T]oday’s purchasers of legal services require their 
services to be delivered promptly, at high quality, and potentially anywhere in the 
world.  [L]awyers and law firms must have the imagination and flexibility to deliver 
legal services of the kind and in the manner clients are likely to require.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra 
note 2, at 973 (referring to Deborah Rhode’s call for a “culture of commitment,” 
Morgan argues that “[i]t is possible that this kind of appeal to professional tradition 
will have more effect in the future than it has had in the past, but it is hard to see 
why”). 
 71. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 24. 
 72. Moore, supra note 24, at 782.  
 73. Id. at 781–82. 
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perform a genuine public service at the same time that it enhanced 
the standing and remuneration of the lawyers themselves.74 
Both lawyer disciplinary codes and lawyer disciplinary enforcement 
have evolved over time, and these changes have often benefited the 
public.  For example, lawyer disciplinary codes began as simple 
statements of ideals that were not meant to be the equivalent of 
statutes or regulations, or even the specific basis for lawyer 
discipline.75  Through the adoption of the ABA Model Code and then 
the ABA Model Rules (including the ongoing process of 
amendment), lawyer ethics codes have become highly specific76 and 
currently are used not only as a basis for disciplinary action, but also 
as a standard of conduct underlying such remedies as lawyer 
disqualification, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits.77  
As for disciplinary enforcement, the formation of bar associations and 
the establishment of peer discipline replaced an earlier system of ad 
hoc exercises of power by individual judges; most recently, courts 
have reasserted their authority over lawyer regulation, creating court-
supervised agencies that employ staff lawyers to conduct both 
investigations and prosecutions and that are beginning to include an 
aspect of public oversight in their disciplinary processes.78  Many of 
these beneficial changes in both the content of lawyer codes and the 
“professionalization” of the disciplinary process came at the behest of 
members of the organized bar, including the ABA Standing 
Committee on Professional Discipline.79 
 
 74. Id. at 782–83 (citing more balanced accounts of the professional tradition and 
modern scholars who “increasingly note both the benefits and the detriments of the 
professionalization process”).  In the end, it does not necessarily matter what the 
motivations of  professionalism proponents are if the net results of their efforts are 
favorable for the public.  Nevertheless, all things being equal, actors who are 
genuinely motivated to serve the public interest are probably more likely to succeed 
in their efforts than those who are not.  In my work with the organized profession, 
including my service as Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission on the Evaluation 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, I have observed many lawyers and 
lawyer groups who, I am convinced, are sincerely motivated by the desire to promote 
the public good. 
 75. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 7, 15. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 541, 543 (1997). 
 78. See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6 (2010). 
 79. See id.  
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I am not so naïve as to ignore or even downplay the serious 
detriments of having lawyers participate actively in their own 
regulation.  Undoubtedly, many of the rules adopted by or at the 
behest of lawyers have not been in the public interest, including those 
restrictions that the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down80 
and some that remain (at least theoretically) intact, such as unduly 
broad prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law by 
nonlawyers.81  Nevertheless, before condemning in toto the process of 
professional self-regulation, I would want to know what alternatives 
were realistically available at any given point in time.  For example, if 
lawyer organizations had not promulgated rules of professional 
conduct, what rules would govern lawyers’ use of client funds?82  
Would the application of general fiduciary principles be as beneficial 
to clients as the strict rules adopted in lawyer ethics codes?83  How 
many clients would have benefited from the application of such 
general fiduciary principles, given that they are usually applied only 
in cases in which it is worthwhile for clients to file lawsuits against 
 
 80. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 73–
79. 
 81. See generally Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).  As Morgan observes it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
the legal profession to prevent nonlawyers from competing with lawyers in the 
provision of legal services. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra 
note 2, at 131 (American lawyers representing individual clients “are likely to find 
themselves increasingly in competition with banks, insurance companies, investment 
advisors, and other organizations that employ legally trained, salaried personnel”). 
 82. Model Rule 1.15 requires lawyers to strictly segregate client funds from the 
lawyers’ own funds and to maintain and preserve complete records of client trust 
accounts. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (1983).  This rule is often 
interpreted to be a rule of strict liability, which means that lawyers may be disciplined 
for trust violations even when such violations are unintentional, or even non-
negligent. See Moore, supra note 78, at 35–37.  Sanctions for violations of this rule 
are among the harshest sanctions imposed: many courts begin with a presumption 
that absent compelling extenuating circumstances an intentional misuse of client 
funds-—including intentional “borrowing” with an intent to repay—-is grounds for 
disbarment. See, e.g., In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1990); see also In re Wilson, 
409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979) (stating that intentional misappropriation will, without 
exception, result in disbarment).  In addition, many states have adopted a system of 
randomly selecting lawyers to produce their books and records to be audited. See, 
e.g., In re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724 (Del. 2003) (disciplining a lawyer after a random 
audit revealed frequently trust fund accounting violations).  
 83. For example, under common law principles, agents are generally subject to 
duties to safeguard a principal’s funds and other property that are similar to those set 
forth in lawyer conduct rules; unlike the lawyer conduct rules, however, an agent’s 
common law duties are subject to modification upon the agreement of the principal. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 (2006). 
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their lawyers?84  Would state legislatures have established client 
protection funds for the reimbursement of clients whose funds were 
misused?85  Would they have developed the system of random audits 
of client trust funds that exists in many states today?86  What about 
rules concerning client confidentiality and conflicts of interest?87  Is it 
clear that leaving the development of such rules to common law or to 
state legislation would have resulted in better protection for clients 
and the public?88 
It is not my purpose to prove or even to argue that the benefits of 
self-regulation outweigh the costs.  Instead, my position is that such a 
question can be answered only after carefully identifying and 
examining, for each historical period (including the present and the 
future), not only the specific costs and benefits of self-regulation, but 
also the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of 
governance.89  In this respect, I find it noteworthy that elsewhere in 
the world public representatives have studied the effects of 
globalization and decided that, despite some glaring failures of self-
regulation (particularly in the U.K., where the Law Society 
 
 84. Breach of a fiduciary duty may entitle a principal to obtain monetary damages 
and non-monetary relief such as an injunction, but such remedies inevitably require 
the filing of a lawsuit to obtain enforcement. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (2006) (discussing remedies available for breach of agent’s 
duty to principal).  Moreover, in the absence of random audits, a lawyer’s breach may 
remain undetected, such as when a lawyer does not remit to the client all of the funds 
to which the client is entitled upon settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise. 
 85. See generally ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 45 (2002) 
(discussing client protection funds collected from lawyers through either mandatory 
court assessment or through voluntary contributions and disbursed to clients 
suffering financial loss as a result of a lawyer’s dishonesty when there is no 
alternative source for reimbursement). 
 86. See supra note 82. 
 87. See, e.g., Moore, “In the Interests of Justice”, supra note 35, at 1789 (crediting 
state bar associations for “initiating or supporting potentially far-reaching proposals, 
such as those requiring lawyers to put fee agreements or conflicts waivers in 
writing”). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 1786–91 (arguing against suggestions that the public would be 
better served by direct public regulation of lawyers through legislatures or 
administrative agencies, using state  court regulation of confidentiality as  evidence 
“that the present system is working pretty well, at least with respect to the 
promulgation of ethics codes”). 
 89. See generally id. (arguing in favor of continuing self-regulation by lawyers, 
including discussion of disadvantages of regulation by state legislatures or 
administrative agencies because of possibility of “capture” by lawyer organizations 
and the lack of public understanding of legal institutions and their role in “areas of 
particular sensitivity” such as the representation of criminal defendants and the 
allocation of decision-making authority).  
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repeatedly ignored warnings concerning grave deficiencies in 
processing client complaints),90 professional organizations can and 
should continue to play an important (although not exclusive) role in 
regulating legal practice. 
Indeed, recent developments in the U.K. and in Australia might be 
interpreted to reflect the following judgment: although lawyers 
cannot necessarily be trusted to implement, on their own initiative, 
appropriate rules governing restrictions on the various forms of legal 
practice, including the structure of law firms and the role of 
nonlawyer owners and managers (in both law firms and alternative 
business structures), lawyers nevertheless may play a useful role in 
developing beneficial standards for other aspects of legal practice, 
including rules governing such important issues as conflicts of 
interest, confidentiality, and the protection of client funds.  They may 
also play a beneficial role in the disciplinary process, whether by 
acting as frontline regulators (as in the U.K. and in Australia) or by 
continuing to note deficiencies in the current procedures and to 
advocate for useful reforms91 (as in the United States, where court 
agencies are typically the frontline regulators in the disciplinary 
process)92.  Using lawyers and lawyer organizations as co-regulators, 
rather than as sole regulators (as they had previously been in the U.K. 
and Australia), may be the right way forward, rather than insisting, as 
Morgan appears to do, that lawyer organizations play no role in 
regulating lawyers’ conduct.  In other words, rather than look to 
deprofessionalization, what lawyers and others ought to do is to work 
toward a form of reprofessionalization, in which the contract between 
society and the profession is modified to take into account the “need 
for systems of regulation that are themselves fit for the new moral 
and political economy.”93 
 
 90. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 20–24. 
 91. For example, it was the ABA that, based on developments in other countries, 
recommended the creation of client protection funds in 1959. See ABA/BNA 
LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 85. 
 92. See Mary Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the 
United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 921–33 (1994) (describing the 
development of disciplinary procedures from the use of volunteer lawyers to the 
hiring of professional legal staff under court supervision). 
 93. Julian Webb, The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of 
English Legal Practice—and Some Lessons for New Zealand?, 16 WAIKATO L. REV. 
21, 37 (2008) (noting, in connection with developments preceding the adoption of the  
Legal Services Act of 2007, that the debate had moved “beyond a crude deregulation 
agenda” toward the establishment of regulations designed to be “efficient, 
systematic, transparent and accountable”).  Other commentators have characterized 
the current period as one involving “postprofessionalism” as opposed to 
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Morgan is perhaps most persuasive when he argues that the current 
developments underlying globalization have created a reality in which 
the assumptions underlying the current hypothetical contract between 
law and society no longer hold true, making it unlikely that even a 
more limited form of professionalism will result in a net benefit to the 
public.  For example, he argues that a growing proportion of the bar 
is representing business entities rather than individuals and that 
business clients—particularly those with in-house counsel—are 
increasingly sophisticated, thereby making it likely that the typical 
client is now in a good position to evaluate and direct its lawyers.94  
Similarly, he argues that advances in information technology, coupled 
with the rising disaggregation and commodification of legal services, 
make it possible for persons who are trained in law (but who are not 
lawyers) to master the discrete knowledge required for any particular 
legal task,95 thereby undermining the sociologist’s understanding that 
the practice of law necessarily requires “substantial intellectual 
training and the use of complex judgments.”96  Indeed Morgan 
concludes that, given the increasing specialization by lawyers, there is 
no longer a “common body of knowledge” that lawyers “bring to bear 
on a similar range of problems;” as a result, there is no reason to even 
attempt to inculcate a “common professional identity” among law-
trained persons.97 
In the long run, Morgan’s assessment of the implications of 
globalization for the future practice of law may prove to be correct.  
 
“deprofessionalization.” See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 39, at 721 (describing 
postprofessionalism as taking into account “changing patterns of political influence, 
rationalization of knowledge, and the growth of technology as a tool of accessing this 
knowledge”); see also Andy Boon et al., Postmodern Professions? The 
Fragmentation of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 32 J.L. SOC’Y 473, 487 
(2005) (“Some may argue that we are seeing the decline of professionalism; others 
may suggest that it is less drastic and can be interpreted as the modernization of 
professionalism, in a ‘third way’ sense.  Whichever assessment is correct, our 
conceptions of professionalism are changing.”).  To me, the term 
“postprofessionalism” does not adequately convey the extent to which the organized 
profession continues to play a significant and meaningful role in the regulation of 
lawyers in U.K. and Australia.  The term “reprofessionalization” is designed to 
suggest a reformulation of the manner and terms on which the organized profession 
plays a role in its own self-governance, but I am not especially attached to this 
particular formulation. 
 94. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 25, 110–23. 
 95. Id. at 91–98. 
 96. Id. at 22–23 n.12 (quoting sociologist Eliot Freidson’s definition of a 
profession in connection with his work as a member of the ABA Commission on 
Professionalism). 
 97. Id. at 129. 
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Indeed, some commentators have already questioned whether lawyer 
organizations in the U.K. can continue to play a meaningful role in 
lawyer regulation, given both the proliferation of licensed legal 
practitioners other than solicitors98 and the fragmentation of lawyers 
that has resulted from increased specialization.99  The question, 
however, is not whether Morgan will ultimately be proved right, but 
rather whether lawyers and lawyer organizations should work to 
prove him wrong, that is, whether there is at least some reason to 
believe that reprofessionalism, along the lines suggested by the 
current reforms in the U.K. and Australia,100 can work for the benefit 
of the public in the United States and elsewhere. 
In my opinion, there are several reasons to be optimistic in 
assessing the outlook for the legal profession.  First, aside from overly 
restrictive regulations concerning the structure of law practice, the 
current rules of professional conduct, particularly those concerning 
such important issues such as conflicts of interest, confidentiality and 
the protection of client funds, are generally beneficial and in 
accordance with the public interest.101  Indeed, except for concerns 
about lack of uniformity as a result of state court regulation,102 it is 
unlikely that either state or federal legislation would produce a better 
alternative.103  Second, lawyers and lawyer organizations have been 
 
 98. See, e.g., Boon et al., supra note 93, at 490 (questioning future role of Law 
Society “[i]f lawyers will be only one component in a portfolio of practitioners 
delivering legal services”); Maute, supra note 15, at 28 (noting the uncertainty 
concerning the future roles of the Law Society and Bar Council, given that 
membership is not voluntary and other entities represent the interests of other legal 
professionals). 
 99. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 93, at 36 (raising questions concerning the 
“capacity of a single regulatory body to maintain . . . its legitimacy, and its capacity to 
regulate . . . [with] a single professional code”).  
 100. I do not purport to address the difficulty of importing the changes in the U.K. 
and Australia to the United States or other countries, given the different manner in 
which the profession historically has been regulated in different parts of the world.  
For a discussion of the manner in which similar reforms might be adopted in the 
United States, see generally Schneyer, supra note 15; Maute, supra note 15. 
 101. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (protection of client funds); 
supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (confidentiality).  For my assessment of the 
lawyer rules on conflicts of interest, see Moore, supra note 77. 
 102. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 29–33 (discussing problems arising as a 
result of “[b]alkanized state-based regulation”). 
 103. Elsewhere, in a co-authored article, I suggested “that it may be time for 
Congress to impose national standards in selective areas, such as conflict of interest 
rules for lawyers engaged in multistate or multinational practice.” Janine Griffiths-
Baker & Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Global Law Firms: 
Peace in Our Time?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2560 (2012). 
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largely or at least partially responsible for changes in other aspects of 
lawyer regulation that likewise benefit the public, such as 
improvements in funding for disciplinary enforcement and the use of 
full-time disciplinary counsel,104 as well as the growing emphasis on 
probation and diversionary programs that take single instances of 
minor neglect or incompetence and handle them administratively in a 
manner designed to protect the public by educating and assisting 
lawyers to develop better practice standards.105  Finally, it may happen 
infrequently in the United States, but there are times when an 
independent legal profession does serve as an important “bulwark 
against arbitrary government authority”106 or other oppression,107 as 
recently happened when the legal community vehemently objected to 
a top Pentagon official’s call for a corporate boycott of law firms 
representing Guantanamo prisoners,108 resulting in the resignation of 
that official.109 
 
 104. See, e.g., Mary Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures 
in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 921–27 (1994) (discussing reforms 
in disciplinary procedures, including providing adequate funding for professional 
staff to process complaints under the centralized control of the state’s highest court, 
as recommended in 1970 by the ABA’s Special Committee on Evaluation of 
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark 
(known as the Clark Committee)). 
 105. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 
11(G) (1986) (providing that “[s]ingle instances of minor neglect or minor 
incompetence . . . should be removed from the disciplinary system and handled 
administratively”).  For a discussion of the “consumer-oriented” approach to lawyer 
regulation, focused on client protection, see Leslie Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and 
Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1998).  For an analysis of the results of the diversion program 
adopted in one state, see Diane Ellis, Is Diversion a Viable Alternative to Traditional 
Discipline? An Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, 14 PROF. LAW. 1, 13 
(2002) (suggesting that lawyers completing the diversion program were statistically 
less likely to become the subject of serious disciplinary complaints in the future). 
 106. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding 
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1275 (1995) (describing but then rejecting this argument in 
favor of an independent bar as “overstated”). 
 107. See Webb, supra note 93, at 44 (“Legal practice continues to play a significant 
role in state formation and reconstruction; it is deeply [implicated] in the creation of 
global capital, and, on a good day, the profession still has the power and the privilege 
to act as a bulwark against oppression of many kinds.”). 
 108. Top Pentagon Official Calls for Boycott of Law Firms Representing 
Guantanamo Prisoners, DEMOCRACYNOW! (Jan. 17, 2007), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_pentagon_official_calls_for_boycott. 
 109. Guantanamo Remarks Cost Policy Chief His Job, CNN (Feb. 2, 2007, 7:24 
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/02/02/gitmo.resignation/. 
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The Pentagon call for a boycott illustrates not only the continuing 
need for a legal profession that (among other public benefits) will 
occasionally stand up against oppression, but also the ongoing 
capacity for different segments of the profession to unite and express 
a common understanding of their professional identity.  Many of the 
lawyers representing the Guantanamo prisoners are partners in the 
largest and most prestigious corporate law firms—firms that have 
committed substantial resources to provide pro bono representation 
in an obviously unpopular cause.110  Thus, despite Morgan’s belief that 
in today’s legal environment corporate lawyers have little in common 
with criminal defense and legal services lawyers, the Guantanamo 
episode proves, to the contrary, that broadly educated lawyers—
despite their location in different “hemispheres” of the bar111—
continue to have much in common with each other.112  This is a 
hopeful sign that lawyers do indeed maintain a common identity, 
something that is essential to the success of any professional project. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of this conference is “The Law: Business or Profession? 
The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of 
Law in the Twenty-First Century.”  I have said very little about 
Cohen’s views, focusing most of my remarks in an attempt to refute 
Morgan’s thesis that law is not and should not be considered a 
profession in any meaningful sense of that term.  I would like to 
conclude, however, by addressing the continuing relevance, if any, of 
the views expressed in Cohen’s 1916 landmark book The Law: 
Business or Profession? for the debate going forward. 
 
 110. See supra note 108 (including remarks of Stephen Oleskey, a litigation and 
real estate partner in WilmerHale, who was representing pro bono six Guantanamo 
detainees). 
 111. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 111 (citing 
John Heniz & Edward Laumann’s study of the Chicago bar, which divided lawyers 
into the two separate “hemispheres” consisting of the corporate sector and the 
individual/small business sector). 
 112. Despite Morgan’s previously stated belief that, given lawyer specialization, 
there is no longer a “common body of knowledge” that lawyers “bring to bear on a 
similar range of problems,” and thus no room for inculcating a “common professional 
identity” among lawyers, see supra note 97 and accompanying text, recent studies 
demonstrate that there is more mobility for lawyers now than in the past and that 
new lawyers frequently move between different practice settings. See RONIT 
DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY 
OF LEGAL CAREERS 54–55, 65–66 (2009). 
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According to Sam Levine, one of the organizers of this conference 
and an expert on Julius Henry Cohen, “Cohen’s book represents the 
first full-length consideration of the business/profession dichotomy, 
an issue that attracted considerable attention around the turn of the 
century and has remained a perennial concern for legal scholars and 
practitioners alike.”113  Cohen took the business/profession dichotomy 
seriously, arguing that the increasing commercialization of law 
practice threatened to reduce law from a profession to a business.  In 
other words, Cohen apparently believed that if law is treated like a 
business or “trade,” then it cannot also be considered a profession.114  
To some extent, these views are anachronistic.  Here I agree with 
Morgan that “the law/business labels are not alternatives”115 and that 
the adoption of more bureaucratic, more efficient business methods 
as part of modern conceptions of law office management are by no 
means antithetical to the public interest.  Indeed, the use of such 
methods—including at least some lawyer advertising—may be 
essential to increasing the availability of affordable legal services.116 
Although some of Cohen’s views may no longer be useful in 
assessing the status of the legal profession, the views of his that I find 
most relevant today are those that emphasize the potential public 
benefits of lawyers considering themselves to be professionals, with 
duties that differ significantly from those of business persons 
generally.  With respect to self-regulation, I have already noted 
Cohen’s observation that many lawyers volunteered their time each 
year to “purging the profession of those who fall below the standards 
of the profession itself.”117  These volunteers were extremely 
important, as it was not until the 1970s that many states began to hire 
 
 113. Email from Samuel J. Levine to Nancy J. Moore (May 30, 2011) (on file with 
author). 
 114. For example, Cohen wrote about “men who combine business skill with the 
professional training of the law.” COHEN, supra note 1, at 211.  He suggested that 
readers “[w]alk into a modern law office and you will think you are in the executive 
office of a large business institution.” Id.  Cohen’s negative attitude toward such 
lawyers is obvious in his conclusion that “[l]iving in such an atmosphere, with his 
office window closer to the Stock Exchange than it is to Trinity Church . . . the 
modern New York lawyer catches the atmosphere he breathes and fast loses the 
larger perspective of his profession.” Id. at 212. 
 115. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 101.  
 116. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON ADVER., LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE 
CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 91–97 (1995) (finding that 
lawyer advertising enables low-income families to find legal representation); id. at 
130 (finding that lawyer advertising may decrease price of legal services and increase 
access to lawyers).  
 117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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staff lawyers to investigate and present disciplinary matters.118  
Moreover, in addition to making the disciplinary system work as well 
as it did, lawyer volunteers formed bar associations and staffed bar 
association committees that not only drafted canons of ethics, but also 
provided advice to lawyers concerned with the application of these 
canons to situations arising in their daily practice of law.119  And while 
some of the activities of bar associations may have been motivated by 
or at least been entirely consistent with the interests of the lawyers 
themselves (such as efforts to enjoin the unauthorized practice of 
law), a substantial portion of the work of bar associations has been 
directed toward distinguishing lawyers from others based on the 
existence of heightened duties towards clients and others, particularly 
courts.120 
Sam Levine characterizes “Cohen’s dedication to his unique form 
of professionalism” as based on “his insistence on independent 
thinking, intellectual honesty, and analytical rigor.”121  As a result, it is 
not surprising that Cohen himself readily acknowledged that some of 
the very reforms he championed in the public interest were being 
championed by other lawyers in a self-interested effort to control the 
level of competition—a motivation he unconditionally rejected.122  
Apparently, Cohen had a far more nuanced view of the 
business/professionalism debate than many others of his time or even 
of ours.  And, as I have tried to demonstrate in this Article, what 
globalization and the recent reforms in the U.K. and Australia 
suggest to me is that U.S. lawyers should themselves adopt a more 
nuanced view of the business/professionalism debate—one that 
focuses very carefully on the question whether continuing to permit 
lawyers to play a significant role in their own regulation is likely to 
provide a net benefit to society, despite the costs that Morgan and 
others have so correctly identified. 
 
 118. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 119. See COHEN, supra note 1, at xvi–xvii, 157–71. 
 120. See id. at 321–32 (Appendix A: Code of Ethics Adopted by the American Bar 
Association, including Canons 1, 3, 9, 15, 17, 18, 21–23, 25, 30–31). 
 121. Levine, supra note 1, at 20. 
 122. COHEN, supra note 1, at 258. 
